

ORIENTAÇÕES SUPERIORES: TIME AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITY IN MOZAMBIQUE

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the production, circulation, and interpretation of regulatory documents in contemporary Mozambique in order to highlight their central importance to processes of governance. The empirical focus is on *orientações superiores* – written and oral documents issued by figures and institutions of authority with the intention of advising on procedures for policy formulation and implementation. By producing *orientações superiores* in a way that leaves their intent ambiguous and their status provisional, party and state officials shift the focus of policy making from substance to process. In this way, bureaucratic authority is produced and reinforced through the manipulation of the timing of policy implementation. This perspective expands current understandings of African governance that on the whole have been limited to the analysis of the effectiveness of African institutions and policies, leaving the tactical effects of ambiguity, timing, and provisionality in policy implementation undertheorized.

IN THE PAST DECADE, RESEARCH ON AFRICAN STATES has drawn attention to public institutions and the daily work of bureaucrats in order to explain how Africans conceive of and participate in processes of governance.¹ Scholars have thus begun to give visibility to public servants² and public

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1. Jean Copans, 'Afrique Noire: un état sans fonctionnaires?', *Autrepart* 20 (2001), pp. 11–26; Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, 'La corruption quotidienne en Afrique de l'Ouest', *Politique Africaine* 83 (2001), pp. 8–37; Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (eds), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic explorations of public and collective services* (Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2009).

2. Brenda Chalfin, 'Sovereigns and citizens in close encounter: airport anthropology and customs regimes in neoliberal Ghana', *American Ethnologist* 34, 4 (2008), pp. 519–38; Gerhard

arenas,³ but the role of documents as central artefacts of governance remains overlooked and underexplored. This article explores governance in Mozambique through the analysis of *orientações superiores* – written and oral documents issued by figures and institutions of authority with the intention of advising on procedures for policy formulation and implementation. As regulatory documents, *orientações superiores* have recently gained more visibility in the context of President Guebuza's highly ritualized 'open and inclusive governance' visits. During these extensive tours to rural and urban districts throughout the country, the President uses closed meetings with state bureaucrats and public meetings such as rallies and inauguration ceremonies to dispense *orientações superiores* to subordinates in the state and party bureaucracy. In turn, broadcast and print media reproduce and circulate these statements, thus making them the object of widespread reflection and debate among civil servants and a wider public.⁴ Regardless of their status as oral, public pronouncements, draft legislation, or indeed legal documents, *orientações superiores* are perhaps the most authoritative documents in Mozambican everyday bureaucratic practice.

In other African contexts there have been reports of the use of similar documents, especially public pronouncements by senior state and party officials meant either to float provisional new policies or to serve as suggestive guides to policy implementation. The circulation of such documents has been important particularly during periods of political transition or economic crisis, when politicians and bureaucrats intend to gauge or generate public support in advance of more resolute policy implementation. For example, after taking office as President in Kenya in 2002, Mwai Kibaki reiterated in his speeches how 'the era of roadside policy declarations' was to be left behind.⁵ His predecessor, President Daniel arap Moi, was well known for his impromptu policy declarations in public rallies, especially when he visited rural districts. In Zambia, President Michael Sata is quickly building a reputation for making policy pronouncements at public events. In fact, Zambians had already become accustomed to the production and circulation of provisional policy documents, which Neo Simutanyi

Anders, 'Like chameleons: civil servants and corruption in Malawi' in Giorgio Blundo and Pierre-Yves Le Meur (eds), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa*, pp. 119–41.

3. Richard Werbner, *Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana: The public anthropology of Kalanga elites* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2004); Christian Lund, 'Twilight institutions: an introduction', *Development and Change* 37, 4 (2006), pp. 673–84.

4. Since his first term in office, Guebuza's speeches are published and widely circulated annually as token-like artefacts of governance reminiscent of the early years of Mozambican independence under the rule of President Samora Machel.

5. See Mwangi wa Githinji and Frank Holmquist, 'Reform and political impunity in Kenya: transparency without accountability', *African Studies Review* 55, 1 (2012), pp. 53–74.

has characterized as the ‘politics of indecision’, during the rule of Rupiah Banda. In the context of the 2009 global financial crises, Simutani wrote:

Many times the same policy proposals are discussed over and over again without reference to why earlier policy commitments were not carried out. While consultation is important in a democracy, that should not take away government’s responsibility to make decisions.⁶

These accounts of the Kenyan and Zambian experiences echo reports of research conducted in Mozambique, which have noted that ambiguities in regulatory documents have protracted the time required for the implementation of policies.⁷ In fact, the production of ambiguous or provisional legislation can be associated with a history of rule that has neglected or devalued legislative work, especially when law-making processes were seen to hinder revolutionary processes. These realities in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa have received little scholarly attention.

In this article, I move the analysis of African governance beyond discussions of the effectiveness of its institutions. By looking at the manner in which policy documents are produced, circulated, and implemented, I seek to gain insights into the ways African bureaucratic institutions contribute to governance without necessarily being effective in delivering public services. I ask how *orientações superiores* have come to be central to Mozambican bureaucratic practice. What is it that makes these such authoritative documents, despite the informal way in which they are authored or delivered? And if *orientações superiores* tend to be oral, provisional, ambiguous, and informal, what are the implications of this for Mozambican bureaucratic practice? What do the answers to these questions tell us about governance in Mozambique and, more broadly, about the ways we understand governance in Africa?

To answer these questions I reconstruct the ‘political life’⁸ of selected written and oral regulatory documents in the Mozambican bureaucracy. I track documents produced during the establishment of District Local Councils and the District Budget for Local Initiatives, two institutions that dominated the agendas of internationally funded NGOs and local

6. Neo Simutanyi, ‘The politics of indecision’, *Zambia Analysis* 3, 4 (2009), p. 9.

7. See, for example, Sue Fleming, ‘Trading in ambiguity: law, rights and realities in the distribution of land in northern Mozambique’ in Olivia Harris (ed.), *Inside and Outside the Law: Anthropological studies of authority and ambiguity* (Routledge, London and New York, NY, 1996), pp. 45–56; Bart Pijnenburg, *Keeping It Vague: Discourses and practices of participation in rural Mozambique* (unpublished PhD dissertation, Wageningen University, 2004).

8. Here I draw inspiration from the works of Igor Kopytoff, ‘The cultural biography of things: commoditization as process’ in Arun Appadurai (ed.), *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in cultural perspective* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986) and John S. Brown and Paul Duguid, ‘The social life of documents’, *First Monday* 1, 1 (1996), <<http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/466/387>> (11 December 2011). I adopt the expression ‘political life’ to emphasize the political in contrast to the technical life of these documents.

governments committed to the decentralization process in the rural areas. In order to reconstruct the 'political life' of these documents, I followed the work of the district administrator, the *chefe do posto*, and the *chefes de localidades*, all state representatives at the district and sub-district levels. This was part of ethnographic field research carried out over a period of 18 months between 2008 and 2009 in Inharrime District, southern Mozambique.

It is important to note that this was a period during which District Local Councils and the District Budget for Local Initiatives were the subjects that featured most prominently in various workshops on good governance, and in public rallies. In addition to field observations, I conducted archival research at the offices of local state representatives in Inharrime District. I also interviewed and collected documents from representatives and field officers for two bilateral, locally based organizations that promoted the establishment of District Local Councils, and combined all the information with a survey of locally based newspapers and magazines published from 2006 to 2009.

I argue that through the production of provisional and ambiguous *orientações superiores*, party and state officials, invested with the authority of the positions and institutions they occupy, shift the focus of policy making from substance to process. As a result, bureaucratic governance becomes less about implementing policies and more about producing bureaucratic authority through continuous policy-making exercises. The Mozambican case also indicates that if we are to expand our understanding of bureaucratic authority and governance in Africa, we need to take our analysis beyond discussions of the effectiveness of African institutions and pay attention to the effects of the processes that create the institutions and policies we study.

I start by discussing comparative materials from Africa and elsewhere to show how, in the everyday work of state bureaucrats, traditional distinctions between written and oral, official and informal, and legal and non-legal need to be relaxed. This allows me to expand the notion of documents to include oral materials and information received from sources such as rumours, public pronouncements of senior party and state officials, newspapers, and magazine reports. In the next section, I trace the historical roots of *orientações superiores* and show how they have regained strength and visibility during Guebuza's rule. This sets the scene for the analysis of the 'political life' of two regulatory documents produced for the establishment of District Local Councils and the District Budget for Local Initiatives. These examples are used to support the ensuing discussions about the semiotic and authoritative character of *orientações superiores*. I conclude by suggesting how a focus on policy-making processes rather than on the effectiveness of policies and institutions provides significant new insights into our understanding of governance in Africa.

Written and oral documents in bureaucratic practice

The workings of modern state bureaucracies are generally analysed through written regulatory documents.⁹ Accordingly, a growing number of studies on state bureaucracy have highlighted the ways in which the production, circulation, interpretation, and archiving of written documents contributes to the production of state power, control, and authority. For example, records, manuals, and regulatory documents have been described as instruments of legibility and administrative control¹⁰ that shape the ways bureaucrats and citizens experience state power and authority.¹¹ This recognition of the role of documents in bureaucratic practices has led to the construction of the archive as an ethnographic site for the study of governance.¹² In Africa, historical and ethnographic studies have also documented the ways in which colonial and post-colonial governments have sought to produce state power and authority through documents. Historian Clifton Crais has shown how African officials ensured imperial expansion in Transkei, South Africa through the dissemination of bureaucratic practices and documents.¹³ Scholars have also documented how, during legislative processes in Zimbabwe, state officials have resorted to participatory approaches in order to expand their legitimacy and control over the public.¹⁴

Although studies of bureaucratic practice have provided us with insights into African governance, Mozambican *orientações superiores* call our attention to the need for expanding the dominant focus on official or legalistic

9. See, for example, Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An outline of interpretive sociology* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1978); Jack Goody, *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986).

10. Illustrations of this can be found in Richard Saumarez Smith, 'Rule-by-records and rule-by-reports: complementary aspects of the British Imperial rule of law', *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 19, 1 (1985), pp. 153–76; James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 1998).

11. See, for example, Emma Tarlo, 'Paper truths: the emergency and slum clearance through forgotten files' in Chris J. Fuller and Véronique Bénéï (eds), *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India* (Hurst and Company, London, 2001), pp. 68–90; Monique Nuijten, 'Between fear and fantasy: governmentality and the working of power in Mexico', *Critique of Anthropology* 24, 2 (2004), pp. 209–30; Matthew S. Hull, 'Ruled by records: the expropriation of land and the misappropriation of lists in Islamabad', *American Ethnologist* 35, 4 (2008), pp. 501–18.

12. In this field, see, for example, Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michelle Pickover, Graeme Reid, and Roger Salek (eds), *Refiguring the Archive* (David Philip, Cape Town, 2002); Ilana Feldman, *Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, authority and the work of rule, 1917–1967* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC and London, 2008).

13. Clifton C. Crais, 'Chiefs and bureaucrats in the making of empire: a drama from the Transkei, South Africa, October 1880', *The American Historical Review* 108, 4 (2003), pp. 1034–56, p. 1039.

14. See for example Robert Seidman, 'How a bill became a law in Zimbabwe: on the problem of transforming the colonial state', *Africa* 52, 3 (1982), pp. 56–76; Sara Rich Dorman, 'NGOs and the constitutional debate in Zimbabwe: from inclusion to exclusion', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, 4 (2003), pp. 845–86.

accounts of documents. As Giorgio Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan have noted, 'we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of informal privatization and the gradual institutionalization of the informal as an everyday method of management of the state'.¹⁵ We also need to move away from dominant interpretive approaches that privilege writing over speech in research on bureaucratic authority and governance. In doing so, I draw inspiration from the work of scholars who have acknowledged the ways in which oral information can be transferred into documents.

For instance, in a more recent account of bureaucratic practice, Jack Goody notes that 'organisations of any kind are generally induced to use all these written and oral techniques'.¹⁶ Goody goes on to give an example of how, in the army, written instructions from top officials are delivered to lower officers in the form of oral instructions that must be memorized. By contrast, in Parliament, the end product of discussions is inscribed in formal documents.¹⁷ Similarly, in his historical work on writing styles and the ways in which documents were central to the constitution of state authority and domination in Yemen, anthropologist Brinkley Messick's analysis of jurisprudence highlights how the production of written documents derived from oral interventions, especially given the weight attributed to 'witnesses' where 'together with orally expressed claims and responses, the recitational shahada (testimony) represented the key theoretical source text of formal judicial procedure, the basic main subject of the sharh of judicial interpretation'.¹⁸ Janet Ewald's study of the kingdom of Taqali, Sudan also presents a compelling account of how, between about 1780 and 1884, political authority privileged face-to-face oral communication and documents.¹⁹

The recognition of the importance of informal and oral documents in bureaucratic practice provides an entry point to the study of Mozambican *orientações superiores* that can be found in written or oral sources, and that at times are not easily distinguishable from other documents such as instructions, information notices, draft laws, guidelines, technical annexes, and party directives – all of which are meant to provide some sense of direction

15. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 'La corruption quotidienne en Afrique de L'Ouest', p. 32. See also Giorgio Blundo, 'Dealing with the local state: the informal privatization of street-level bureaucracies in Senegal', *Development and Change* 37, 4 (2006), pp. 799–819.

16. Jack Goody, 'Oralité et modernité dans les organisations bureaucratiques', *Communication et Langages* 136 (2003), pp. 4–12, p. 5.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

18. Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual domination and history in a Muslim society* (University of California, Berkeley, CA, 1993), p. 209. See also the work of information science scholars like Michael Buckland, 'What is a "document"?', *Journal of the American Society for Information Science* 48, 9 (1997), pp. 804–9; and Deborah Turner, *Conceptualizing Oral Documents* (Proquest, Ann Arbor, MI, 2007).

19. Janet Ewald, 'Speaking, writing, and authority: explorations in and from the kingdom of Taqali', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, 2 (1988), pp. 199–224.

in policy implementation. To be sure, the very fact that *orientações superiores* build interchangeably on written and oral, official and informal, or legal and non-legal sources calls for a reconsideration of traditional understandings of the workings of modern state bureaucracies.

Orientações superiores as regulatory documents

In the official discourse of Frelimo, most of what was to be implemented during the first years that followed independence was rooted in the experiences of the liberated areas during the struggle. While not taking for granted the extent to which the limited and context-specific lessons from the liberated areas could be carried over to the government of independent Mozambique,²⁰ one can certainly track *orientações superiores* back to that period.²¹ *Orientações superiores* were an appropriate and efficient technique of policy dissemination when the main aim of the documents was to mobilize people into Frelimo's political project. In particular, the circulation of oral and often secret information was an effective organizational instrument.²²

As the liberation movement spread its operations throughout the country and its membership grew, Frelimo also used to produce written publications to communicate with its members and sympathizers. Context-appropriate publications included periodicals such as *A Voz da Revolução* and *Mozambique Revolution*, both organs of the Central Committee, the *25 de Setembro* for the armed forces, *Rasgando as Trevas* published by the Department of Education and Culture, and the *Boletim de Célula*. These publications disseminated party directives and *orientações superiores* and often included sections dedicated to the study of party documents, especially to speeches given by party leaders. In Samora Machel's words, these publications were the 'most powerful weapons' for reaching people where the liberation movement was not able to be physically present during the struggle.²³ However, in 1971 with the launch of a series from the Department of Information and Propaganda called *Estudos e Orientações*, the circulation of *orientações superiores* gained wider significance. Set to

20. For a critique of the transposition of the 'experiences' of the liberated areas to the government of independent Mozambique, see Brito's discussion of the role of Marxism in Frelimo's liberation struggle. Luís de Brito, *Le Frelimo et la Construction de L'État National au Mozambique: Le sens de la référence au Marxisme (1962–1983)* (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Université de Paris VIII, 1991).

21. A proper genealogy of the use of *orientações superiores* in Mozambican contemporary governance would begin, in fact, with the colonial period.

22. See for example Harry West, "Who rules us now?" Identity tokens, sorcery, and other metaphors in the 1994 Mozambican elections' in Harry West and Todd Sanders (eds), *Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of suspicion in the new world order* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC and London, 2003).

23. Samora Machel, *O Partido e as Classes Trabalhadoras Moçambicanas na Edificação da Democracia Popular* (Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da Frelimo, Maputo, 1977).

‘elevate the theoretical level [of the understanding of Frelimo’s ideology] and ensure the widespread circulation of the main [party] *orientações*’,²⁴ the series mainly published President Machel’s speeches or extracts from them.

Following independence, a number of party publications such as *Boletim de Célula* and the series *Estudos e Orientações* continued to be published. Together with directives and resolutions emanating from party congresses, they became the main documents of reference for party cadres who also worked as state bureaucrats. In addition, the ruling party sought to control the editorial lines of public media and to have publications such as *Tempo* magazine endorse its revolutionary socialist project.²⁵ Print and broadcast media also included sections and programmes to disseminate party directives and *orientações superiores*.

In the rural districts, radio is perhaps the most important source of *orientações superiores*. In broadcast news, even though it may not be in real time, local state officials and bureaucrats can hear the voices of high-ranking figures give updated versions of *orientações superiores*. As with the public media, a number of newsletters and magazines published by governmental departments have served the same purpose. Government-published newsletters and magazines are often discontinued after half a dozen issues for lack of funding or following changes in leadership within the ministries, but these publications remain in the desks, drawers, and archives of state officials and bureaucrats, thus remaining as important sources of *orientações superiores*.²⁶

The prominence of written and oral regulatory documents during the first decades after independence can be associated with the political line of thought championed by former President Machel, according to which bureaucratic and legislative processes distanced the government from the people and hampered the speedy implementation of the socialist revolutionary project. As such, legislative bodies like the national and local assemblies played a marginal role in the production of legislation, not to mention bureaucratic practice. As Bertil Egerö noted, ‘the first National Assembly responsible for enacting legislation, approving state budgets, overseeing state activities and approving state plans often met a few days after the party

24. Samora Machel, *A Nossa Luta* (Imprensa Nacional, Maputo, 1975).

25. For a discussion of public media in post-independence Mozambique, see for example Cláudio Jone, ‘Press and democratic transition in Mozambique, 1990–2000’ (IFAS Working Paper Series, Johannesburg, 2005).

26. A good example of such publications is *Servidor Público*, a quarterly magazine published by the Ministry of State Administration in 2006. It was discontinued after two issues but, because it contained extracts of the President’s speech at the opening of a national seminar for district administrators held in the same year, the issue in question was kept in circulation, and read over and over by local state representatives at the district level. See *Servidor Público*, ‘Administradores distritais: comandantes da luta contra a pobreza—Presidente da República na abertura do Semnário Nacional dos Administradores Distritais’, Maio 2006, p. 13.

central committee meeting'.²⁷ Margaret Hall and Tom Young also argued that 'all the legislative work of the National Assembly was done by its Permanent Commission, which comprised senior Frelimo leadership. Not surprisingly, deputies of the Popular Assemblies do little work in this capacity between sessions of the Assembly.'²⁸ In this context and in line with the first constitution of Mozambique, which declared that the party was to 'lead the state and society', party institutions and their leaders became the regulatory authorities. Such was the centrality of the party leadership in the legislative process that in the first years that followed independence, Richard Williams remarked that 'presidential speeches are the major channel by which party initiatives or new party policies are announced'.²⁹

During the rule of Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's second President, senior government and party officials' speeches continued to be vehicles for policy announcements. It is, however, during the current regime of President Guebuza that *orientações superiores* have assumed ever-greater importance in the culture and practice of governance. The extensive media coverage of President Guebuza's 'open and inclusive governance' visits, for example, has made public rallies an important stage for the public pronouncement of *orientações superiores*. Also, in contrast to former President Chissano, but similar to President Machel, Guebuza began to publish his speeches with the intention of providing an orienting reference document for the implementation of the government's five-year plans.³⁰ In a context of continuous sidelining of legislative work, 'political' and 'government' documents³¹ that circulate through public media, party channels, and state bureaucracy become, effectively, the regulatory documents most sought after by local state officials and bureaucrats who have to implement policies.

The 'political life' of two orientações superiores

As used in Mozambican bureaucratic practice, *orientações superiores* have three main characteristics: first, they are always issued by people or institutions hierarchically superior to the receiver; second, they are often ambiguous, suggesting parameters for action without being precise; third, they are

27. Bertil Egerö, 'People's power: the case of Mozambique' in Barry Munslow (ed.), *Africa: Problems in the transition to socialism* (Zed Books, London and New Jersey, 1986), pp. 114–39, p. 125.

28. Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since independence* (Hurst and Company, London, 1997), p. 77.

29. Richard Williams, 'We are declaring war on the enemy within', *People's Power in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau* 16 (1980), p. 33.

30. See the editorial for the first volume of the annual collection of President Guebuza speeches, CEDIMO, *A Nossa Missão: O combate contra a pobreza* (Académica, Maputo, 2006).

31. Interviewed state officials and bureaucrats often sought to distinguish between party and bureaucratic work by referring to the former as 'political' and the latter as 'government'. This distinction is also applied to documents.

generally provisional documents and can exist as such for several years. In the case descriptions that follow, I focus on these characteristics. The aim is not to say that in Mozambican bureaucratic practice there are no clearly written regulatory documents, but to highlight the ways in which informal, oral, and provisional documents are central to governance.

In the case descriptions that follow, I move between moments of production, circulation, and interpretation of documents or their official, informal, or non-legal sources, in order to better reveal their plasticity and interconnectedness. I begin with a discussion of the process that established District Local Councils in rural Mozambique, in which I draw a genealogy of the *Guião de orientação dos Conselhos Locais* (Orientation Guide for the Establishment of Local Councils) – the document that conceptualized the District Local Councils that I witnessed unfolding in 2008 and 2009. Here, my primary focus is on written documents in order to highlight the ways in which their provisional and ambiguous character invites exercises of interpretation that lead to new documents, thus delaying policy implementation.

In the second case, I turn to the process that led to the establishment of the District Budget for Local Initiatives.³² There, the focus is on a document entitled *Procedimentos para a implementação de projectos de geração de rendimento, emprego e produção de alimentos a nível distrital* (Procedures for the Implementation of Income Generation Projects, Employment and Production of Food at the District Level). The case discussion, based on oral pronouncements made before, during, and after the issue of this written document, highlights the ways in which oral documents – in conjunction with provisional and ambiguous written ones – are used to speed up policy implementation. Together, the cases show how party and state officials determine the timing of policy implementation through the production, circulation, and interpretation of provisional and ambiguous documents.

The *Guião de orientação dos Conselhos Locais*: The establishment of District Local Councils has a history that can be traced back to experiments in decentralized district planning and finance in Northern Mozambique funded by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). In 1998, a pilot National Programme on Decentralized Planning and Finance³³ was developed in the Monapo, Muecate, and Mecuburi districts of the northern province of Nampula, and in September of the same year, the ministries of State Administration and of Planning and Finance issued a brochure entitled *Plano distrital de desenvolvimento: orientações para a elaboração e implementação*, which explained the procedure for the elaboration

32. From 2009, the district budget was transformed into a District Development Fund. See Decree 90/2009 de 15 de Dezembro.

33. Programa de Planificação e Finanças Descentralizadas (PPFD).

of district development plans.³⁴ Drawing on those pilot experiences, this document recommended the creation of Consultative Councils³⁵ in which civil society – the communities – would participate in the drawing up of locally relevant district development plans. While establishing these Consultative Councils, district-level technical teams composed of senior public servants performed participatory rural appraisals at the community level, aiming to direct the results into five-year district development plans.

From the experiences of Nampula Province, similar pilot projects were later developed in the central provinces of Tete, Manica, Sofala, and Zambézia with the support of the World Bank and GTZ/PRODER. All of these experiments were followed by evaluation studies and seminars at the provincial and central level, carried out to identify ‘best practices of community participation’ and ‘downward accountability’.³⁶ As a result, in October 2003 the ministries of State Administration and of Planning and Finance, together with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, disseminated a booklet entitled *Participação e Consulta Comunitária na Planificação Distrital: Guião para organização e funcionamento*.³⁷

The document presented a four-tier structure in which the district administrator and the *chefe de posto administrativo* headed the two higher institutions, the District Consultative Council³⁸ and the Administrative Post-Consultative Council, respectively. The two lower-level institutions, the *fórum local* and the *comités comunitários*, were described as ‘civil society institutions’, not to be led by state officials. By the time this booklet was formally published, draft versions of the document had been widely circulated, and in some cases used, in the process of establishing Consultative Councils throughout the country. In this document, Local Councils were integrated in the broad category of Institutions of Community Participation and Consultation (IPCCs).

In May 2003, in a parallel process, the government published a law – *Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado* – that established the principles and norms for the organization, as well as the expected competencies and functioning of ‘state organs’ at the level of the province, district, administrative post, and

34. See MAE and MPF, *Plano Distrital de Desenvolvimento: Orientações para elaboração e implementação* (Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, Maputo, 1998).

35. Consultative Councils, also referred to as District Local Councils, are district and sub-district level civil society institutions that work as a platform for participatory governance.

36. See, for example, Charlotte Allen and Connie Dupont, ‘Study of IPCCs (Local Councils): case studies in Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces’ (Unpublished consultancy report, Maputo, 2007).

37. MAE, MPF, and MADER, ‘Participação e consulta comunitária na planificação distrital: guião para organização e funcionamento’ (Maputo, 2003). It is important to note that dates of publication work as landmarks but the practice is that the content of final documents often circulates prior to the official publication dates in the form of draft documents, and also that final versions of documents may take weeks, if not months, to reach some districts.

38. Presently also the District Local Council.

localidade.³⁹ However, it was not until June 2005 that the government published a bill (*Regulamento da Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado*) that allowed the law to be implemented.⁴⁰

The tinkering with the ideas of decentralized government and good governance led to the production of many short-lived documents and institutions in various districts until the *Guião sobre a organização e o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais* (Guidelines for the organization and functioning of Local Councils)⁴¹ led to the establishment of the District Local Councils that I observed in 2008 and 2009.

Like previous documents, by the time it was approved in November 2008 various drafts of the *Guião sobre a organização e o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais* had been widely circulated and in some cases used as *orientações superiores* to create District Local Councils. In fact, by 2004, about four years before the approval of the *Guião*, the government of Inhambane Province, with the support of the German Society for International Cooperation (GTZ), began the establishment of Local District Councils in four pilot districts (Massinga, Funhalouro, Mabote, and Panda). From 2006 onwards, these institutions were established in all twelve districts of Inhambane Province. However, established District Local Councils in Inharrime spent most of their time discussing what the competences and duties of its members were, as the draft of the *Guião* was unclear about these matters.⁴² As a result, in the name of strengthening civil society, a number of locally based NGOs organized numerous workshops dedicated to the interpretation of the document.⁴³

During fieldwork in Inharrime District, I met a bureaucrat who had just arrived from Maputo, where he had attended a dissemination workshop for a study commissioned by the Ministry of Planning and Development to evaluate the experiences of community participation and consultation in various districts throughout the country.⁴⁴ He brought with him a CD containing documents to be circulated at the district level. The main document was the *Guião sobre a organização e o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais*, still

39. Lei n° 8/2003 de 19 de Maio, I Série, n° 20.

40. Decreto n° 11/2005 de 10 de Junho, I Série, n° 23.

41. See MAE and MPD, 'Guião sobre a organização e o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais' (Maputo, 2008).

42. A brief survey of minutes of meetings of recently established District Local Councils revealed that they spent 90 percent of their time discussing how the institution should work. See Euclides Gonçalves, 'Consulta e participação comunitária no processo de desenvolvimento: notas sobre o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais do Distrito (DRAFT)' (Cooperação Suíça, Maputo, 2008).

43. These included the GTZ, the Mozambican Christian Council, FOPROI, and PODES in Inhambane Province.

44. See SAL-CDS and Massala, 'Study of community participation in district planning: North, Centre and Southern regions (Niassa, Nampula, Tete, Zambézia, Inhambane, and Gaza provinces) – Final Consolidated Report' (Maputo, 2009).

containing contentious issues highlighted in grey and, in some sections, there were suggestions for new wording that would significantly alter the content of the document. These ‘track changes’ were signs of the provisionality of the document, even though it was to be implemented.

As ambiguities in the draft of *Guião* allowed for diverse interpretations and different strategies on the creation and functioning of District Local Councils, the media played a key role in providing information to fill in the gaps and harmonize practices. Local media in Inhambane aired and published excerpts of speeches and interviews with senior government officials on the subject. The most recurrent were excerpts of the provincial governor’s interviews and addresses. For example, the lead story of the April 2007 issue of *Mahungo*, a bulletin published by the provincial government of Inhambane, builds on the pronouncements the governor of the province made in a meeting with representatives of District Local Councils of the whole province, and publicizes the warnings of the governor: ‘We do not want Local Councils that are compromised⁴⁵ with the government; we do not want sleepyheads. We want an organ that fights for the reduction of poverty in the communities.’⁴⁶ These kinds of remarks about what the government ‘wants’ and ‘does not want’ were repeated in various speeches by government officials and, in the context of the decentralization reform, became signals that indicated appropriate interpretations of the draft document.⁴⁷

The District Budget for Local Initiatives: In 2005, following earlier debates on the establishment of District Development Funds, a law was passed stating that each district would be receiving an annual District Budget for Local Initiatives, popularly known as the ‘Budget of 7 million’.⁴⁸ From 2006, districts began to make use of the allocated district budget, although no clear guidelines had been passed down from higher institutions. Thus, in line with NGO-promoted district development participatory planning, district administrations began to use the money for public infrastructure projects previously identified by the district administration and District Local Councils. However, early in 2006, uncertainty about how to use the money began to grow among administrators as

45. The term ‘compromised’ has traditionally been used to refer to those who, in one way or another, worked for the colonial government. In this case, the governor wanted to highlight the fact that members of District Councils should not see themselves as members of the government, although they were expected to do work which would help the government to improve.

46. *Mahungo*, April 2007, p. 1.

47. ‘That’s what the governor [or district administrator] said’ is the way local state officials I interviewed justified the way they went about establishing Local District Councils.

48. See Law 12/2005 of December 2005 and subsequently the Decree 90/2009 of 15 December. At the time the amount was approximately equivalent to US\$ 280,000, and it has been increased several times.

critiques of the mishandling and misuse of the district budget became common in the media.

This uncertainty grew out of presidential pronouncements made during 'open and inclusive governance' visits and a speech made during the first Council of Ministers meeting in August 2006, attended by provincial governors and district administrators.⁴⁹ The speeches emphasized poverty reduction at the district level, in particular the 'production of food, job creation, and income generation' among local communities. District Councils were expected to play a key role in the process of selection and monitoring of financed projects. In 2007, 'political instructions' emphasized that the budget should be exclusively used for 'food production and job creation'.⁵⁰

In the meantime, the media's coverage of what were usually spectacular presidential visits ensured the publicity of the President's remarks: 'In the management of the 7 million meticals: Guebuza exhorts the people to be vigilant';⁵¹ 'In spite of minor constraints: Guebuza believes that the seven million are changing the districts';⁵² '7 million: district governments now understand the spirit'.⁵³ Ministers, provincial governors, and district administrators who had been encouraged to conduct 'open and inclusive governance' visits in areas of their jurisdiction repeated the President's speeches in government and public meetings.⁵⁴

Within the state bureaucracy, written documents that circulated provided scant detail on how to proceed in 'food production and job creation'. In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and Development produced an 8-page technical annex to guide the use of the District Budget for Local Initiatives. The document, entitled 'Annex I. Procedures for the implementation of income generation projects, employment and production of food at the district level', set out to support district governments in the preparation and use of the District Budget for Local Initiatives for the year 2008. The document presented the aim and scope of the district budget and gave examples of 'non-recommended projects', while also establishing the 'eligibility criteria' and the role to be played by the district government and by the District Local Councils. Yet, when when procedures were put into practice, a number of grey areas emerged – especially as the President continued to

49. MPD, 'Relatório balanço da implementação do orçamento de investimento de iniciativa local, 2006–2008 (Draft 3)' (MPD, Maputo, 2009), p. 8.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Domingo*, 'Na gestão dos 7 milhões: Guebuza exorta população a ser vigilante', 27 May 2007, p. 20.

52. *Magazine Independente*, 'Guebuza acredita que sete milhões estão a mudar os distritos', 22 October 2008, p. 22.

53. *Domingo*, '7 milhões: Governos distritais já entendem o espírito', 11 May 2008, p. 4.

54. See for example: *AIM*, 'Mozambique: minister criticized district abuse of funds', 15 September 2006; *Noticias*, 'Do investimento distrital: sete milhões devem produzir resultados nas comunidades', 9 January 2007, p. 1.

make remarks on how the budget should be used for ‘food production and job creation’.

In common with other districts in the country, Inharrime made its first budget allocation for infrastructure projects in 2006 in conformity with prior district planning exercises based on civil society participation. The initial projects included the building of a district prison and the renovation of the local market. As a result of the President’s speeches, as repeated by the provincial governor and the district administrator in public meetings and sessions of the District Local Council, the building of the prison was abandoned in its final stages and had not been completed by the end of my fieldwork in 2009. In a District Local Council session organized on the occasion of the visit of the provincial governor, he orally presented *orientações superiores* on ‘how the money should be used’ and ‘the role of the District Local Council in the selection and monitoring of projects’. Although pedagogic in intent, these *orientações superiores* did not even begin to address the various ‘technical questions’ of the local commission for the evaluation of projects, especially since the governor simply repeated the vaguely suggestive phrases used by the President – such as, ‘this money is not to be given to friends’ and ‘this money is to produce food and create jobs for the poor’.⁵⁵

‘Technical questions’ relating to who was eligible to receive the money (especially the eligibility of state bureaucrats), how much money was reasonable to give per hectare for agricultural projects, which projects other than agriculture could be contemplated, what percentage of the money was to be reimbursed by recipients, and whether or not the reimbursed money could be returned in an equivalent number of cattle, were some of the issues that dominated public debate at the district and sub-district level. Between 2008 and 2009, news about the District Budget for Local Initiatives featured on most news programmes and sparked debates in public rallies and newspapers. Of particular interest in Inhambane Province were people’s exposés of how the governor or local state officials mishandled the money.⁵⁶ In Homoine District, the permanent secretary was removed from office following a visit of the governor in August 2008.⁵⁷ In the neighbouring district of Zavala, a heated debate on the District Budget for Local Initiatives held at a District Local Council session headed by the governor led to the dismissal of the district’s director of economic activities.

News of senior state and Frelimo Party visits to the districts, and the pronouncements and decisions they made regarding the ‘7 million’, generated

55. Field observation, Inharrime, 9 June 2008.

56. See, for example, *Notícias*, ‘Mabote: nepotismo na gestão dos 7 milhões – denuncia população de Inhambane na recente Presidência Aberta e Inclusiva de Armando Guebuza’, 4 September 2008, p. 4.

57. The radio news was also published in the daily *Notícias*, ‘Exonerado Secretário Permanente de Homoine’, 23 August 2008, p. 3.

abundant commentary and much conjecture by members of the public and state bureaucrats at the district and sub-district levels. One such instance was during a radio interview, when a district administrator in Gaza declared that there would be measures taken against those who did not return the money loaned to them.⁵⁸ In the ‘tuck shops’ where I followed the news, the debate focused on what the measures could be, and mainly on whether people could be arrested for not reimbursing state money. In one instance, the discussion turned to the village level, where we speculated on the fate of those we knew had used the money to open tuck shops and subsequently drunk the alcohol they were supposed to sell, and allowed family members to take groceries without ever paying; people who had started drinking condensed milk and wine; or others who used the money to organize *xidilos*.⁵⁹ During these debates some rural dwellers would argue that the money was ‘a trap’: ‘Before you get the money they come to your house to see what you have and then if you can’t pay, they come and take everything.’ Others added that running away or resettling were not options because ‘he who owes the state has nowhere to run. Even if you go to South Africa, in coordination with the South African government, they can still find you.’⁶⁰

In a context where provisional and ambiguous documents proliferated, some state officials and bureaucrats felt that the money was a ‘[land]mine’ (in the same way that some citizens thought of it as a ‘trap’) that could easily be mishandled, as guidelines constantly changed. Some bureaucrats who might have helped, instead chose to distance themselves from the process; in this way they not only avoided being the recipients of the allocated budget but also ensured that they were not involved in the process of selecting projects and then monitoring those they had approved. Local media reports that invariably published news of the governor’s critiques of state bureaucrats, or people’s exposés of state officials’ mismanagement of the budget, gave further incentive to disavow responsibility for the policy implementation.

Of written and oral regulatory documents

The *Guião de orientação dos Conselhos Locais* is a good illustration of how some written regulatory documents can exist in a state of provisionality for an exceptionally long period of time. In this instance, the continuous

58. The weekly *Domingo* had also published an article that quoted President Guebuza saying ‘Those who will not reimburse the money will be penalised.’ See *Domingo*, “‘Aqueles que não reembolsarem o dinheiro serão penalizados’ – alerta o presidente da República, Armando Guebuza, em face do avolumar de casos de não reembolso dos fundos por parte dos beneficiários em quase todos distritos que já escalou’, 10 August 2008, p. 18.

59. *Xidilos* are large family ritual reunions to praise the ancestors.

60. Field observation notes, Cove, Mahalamba, Inharrime, 24 June 2009.

revisions to the *Guião* and the supporting documents and workshops it generated meant that it took almost a decade for the policy to be implemented. Nonetheless, it was precisely its prolonged status as unfinalized and ambiguous that made the *Guião* so generative of governance activity by bureaucrats. This was not so much the activity of implementation, but that of continuous reinterpretation. What stands out from the case of the district budget is the way in which ambiguity was preserved rather than redressed as the “7 million” policy directive was implemented over time. In this case, the President made a series of oral pronouncements both to make known the creation of this new budget for development initiatives and to indicate broadly how the money should be spent.

In the absence of clear and specific written directives the whole process was managed, however, through the continuous dissemination of vague remarks in the media and in various public fora. While these worked to signal the broadly appropriate direction for officials to follow, they did little to address the ‘technical questions’ left unclear in the written procedures for implementation. These unresolved questions did not, however, paralyse efforts by bureaucrats and politicians to implement the new policy. Indeed, given the contexts in which the presidential remarks were made (the meeting with governors and district administrators, the subsequent presidential visits to the districts and the availability of the money), local officials made efforts to implement the District Budget for Local Initiatives – as appropriately and effectively as they could – almost as soon it was announced.

Together, the two cases show how ‘open and inclusive governance’ visits, public rallies, District Local Council meetings, and newspaper or radio interviews are the preferred avenues to pass on *orientações superiores*. They also show that written and oral documents continuously cross-fertilize one another. It is for this reason that President Guebuza and the then governor of Inhambane Province were comfortable making oral *orientações superiores* that did more to generate new questions than to clarify existing ones. To reinforce the point, consider the reply to district administrators in Zambézia Province who complained that ‘lack of clarity’ and ‘political interference’ led to the mishandling of the District Budget for Local Initiatives. The provincial governor replied: ‘There is no reason. Administrators had the opportunity to hear the head of state say that the budget is to produce food and create jobs for our fellow citizens. What more clarification do we want?’⁶¹

There are many other cases when documents that have been revised and finalized nevertheless anticipate, quite explicitly, their own continuous modification. A good example of this is the most recent version of *Community*

61. *Notícias*, ‘Interferências lesam gestão dos sete milhões – queixam-se administradores da Zambézia’, 29 April 2008, p. 1.

Participation and Consultation in District Planning: A guidebook for the organization and operation. An extract of the guidebook's prologue reads:

The document under consideration does not exhaust all the aspects of the dialogue between public administration at the district level and the communities. It seeks to point to the most important aspects related to the concepts, structure, and methodology for the operation of the Institutions of Community Participation and Consultation in relation to district planning. Moreover, this document has been concluded in a moment in which other normative instruments of the ongoing reform, in particular the Regulation for the Law of Local State Organs, are yet to be produced. Thus, we anticipate the periodical updates of the current guidelines to keep its consistency with the juridical framework in place and to equally adjust the contents on the basis of the experience of its implementation on the ground. In this context, members of civil society and functionaries of public institutions, especially its users, are encouraged to analyse the material presented here, and according to their field experience, present suggestions for its enrichment.⁶²

The cases outlined above also put into perspective the ways in which the production and circulation of ambiguous and provisional documents work to determine the timing of policy implementation. In fact, government officials have occasionally made this explicit. For example, the former permanent secretary of Zambézia Province has publicly stated that the criteria for the use of the district budget had been 'left open' to encourage 'creativity'.⁶³ Two years later, the Ministry of Planning and Finance confirmed this position in a report presented at a national meeting to discuss the District Budget for Local Initiatives:

Although a document on the procedures being observed on OIIL⁶⁴ has not been formalized, all the Provincial Directorates of Planning and Finance received a version for debate, constituting an important reference for the implementation of OIIL... Being a learning process, the final regulation of OIIL was left open. This tactical measure allowed for the accumulation of different experiences and practices which, summed up, allow for adequate decision making and confer a new dynamic on the process.⁶⁵

State and NGO-organized workshops, seminars, and conferences, such as the national meeting to discuss the District Budget for Local Initiatives, are occasions for exercises in the interpretation of *orientações superiores*. It is through participating in such meetings that local state officials and bureaucrats are able to navigate the operational implications of regulatory documents that otherwise remain ambiguous and provisional. As illustrated by the first case study, in everyday practice, the provisionality and ambiguity of *orientações superiores* are moderated by bureaucrats' acute knowledge of the

62. Prologue to MAE, MPF, and MADER, 'Participação e Consulta Comunitária' (my translation).

63. *Notícias*, 'Gestão dos sete milhões nos distritos. Deixamos o critério em aberto para estimular a criatividade – Albertina Tivane, Secretária Permanente da província da Zambézia', 15 February 2007, p. 2.

64. OIIL (District Budget for Local Initiatives).

65. MPD, 'Relatório Balanço da Implementação', p. 10 (my translation).

discursive contexts in which these documents circulate, thus limiting the range of possible interpretations attributed to them.

In Mozambican bureaucratic practice, the centrality of oral, informal, provisional, and ambiguous documents allows for the calibration and manipulation of the timing of policy implementation. Governance is less about delineating unambiguous and effective policies and more about controlling time through the exercise of bureaucratic authority and the management of bureaucratic procedures. I would argue that, in the Mozambican case, it is by exerting control over the timing of implementation that party and state officials produce and reproduce their own authority in the course of undertaking bureaucratic work itself.

Bureaucratic symbols of authority

But what is it that makes *orientações superiores* such compelling documents? Why are they considered to be authoritative documents that should guide local state officials and bureaucrats in the execution of their duties and in the implementation of policies? The authority of regulatory *orientações superiores* may come from their content, the status of their author, the elegance of their form, or the graphic symbols and linguistic signifiers that are meaningful in the contexts where they circulate. Although it is not possible to make sense of *orientações superiores* by locating them in binary distinctions that oppose the formal to the informal or the written to the oral, it is possible to identify symbols of authority associated with written and oral documents of this kind.

In written *orientações superiores* that circulate within the state bureaucracy, signatures of high ranking state officials and the state emblem are two key features. Even if *orientações superiores* may be provisional and ambiguous documents, they always carry these symbolic markers of authority. As Béatrice Fraenkel noted in her study of the performative dimension of written documents, ‘authenticity is obtained by special treatment of the written document, in particular by adding a number of signs (seals, stamps, signatures). This is the written document that serves as the basis for the manufacture of the act.’⁶⁶ These symbols of authority not only invest documents with performative power but also legitimize their use. In a context where state bureaucrats see others as either friends or enemies, anyone who makes use of these documents looks for these symbols of authority to avoid being accused of drawing on materials from the enemy or collaborating with the opposition.

The centrality of these symbols of authority is such that NGOs and consultancy companies working at local or national levels chase state seals, stamps, emblems, or the signatures of government officials in order to have

66. Béatrice Fraenkel, ‘Actes écrits, actes oraux: la performativité à l’épreuve de l’écriture’, *Études de Communication* 28 (2006), pp. 69–93.

their documents taken seriously by any bureaucrat. In this economy of symbols, the state, NGOs, and consultancy companies exchange symbols to legitimate the circulation of certain documents among bureaucrats or to present the work of NGOs as if they were government's achievements.⁶⁷

As written *orientações superiores* circulate in institutional environments, the place where a document is received adds to or subtracts from its authority and legitimacy. The first place of reference for state officials is government buildings. For state bureaucrats, this happens by default, but NGOs at the national and local levels have also begun to lean more towards government buildings instead of opting for conference rooms in fancy hotels and tourist resorts. In Inharrime District, the *sala de sessões* of the district government is the preferred place. The second place of reference for local state bureaucrats is the local party headquarters, as local state officials and bureaucrats are often members of Frelimo, the ruling party.

Oral *orientações superiores* generally derive their authority from the status of the speaker. Senior government officials are often those whom local state officials and bureaucrats look up to, and whose authority they fear. However, in the national context, figures of authority for local state officials and bureaucrats are not restricted to senior government and state officials such as ministers, governors and district administrators. Other figures of power or authority such as the country's First Lady and Frelimo Party representatives at all levels are equally important sources of authoritative *orientações superiores*. The oral pronouncements of these figures of authority in closed and public meetings often go on to become written *orientações superiores* as they circulate in the form of news reports or bureaucratic instructions, directives, and draft laws.

Contrary to written regulatory documents, at the point of reception, some oral *orientações superiores* do not have an identifiable author. It is up to the receiver to imagine from where in the hierarchy they might have originated. In that, perhaps, lies a significant part of their performative force. Well aware of Frelimo's historical bureaucratic practice, in which *orientações superiores* have always come from high-ranking or even top officials, local state officials and bureaucrats must infer their source from the discursive and political context in which they are delivered.

Orientações superiores and the timing of policy making

The circulation of provisional and ambiguous written and oral regulatory documents in state bureaucracies is not a practice that is exclusive to the

67. Although from the field site it was not possible to follow directly the processes of negotiation of signatures of senior government officials, scholars who have studied the decentralization process in Mozambique have reported on how project evaluation reports have been delayed because documents took so long to be signed in the respective ministries. See, for example, Pijnenburg, 'Keeping it vague'.

Mozambican bureaucracy, as the earlier references to contemporary Kenya and Zambia show. However, in contexts where such practices are central to modes of governance, the implications have not yet been fully acknowledged. The Mozambican case brings to the fore a number of analytical and methodological insights that need to be taken into account if we are to deepen our understanding of governance in Africa.

On an analytic level, we need to begin by expanding our formal and material notion of 'documents' to include oral, informal, and provisional modes of policy articulation. The latter, as well as existing in relation to written legal documents, may in fact be more influential and effective than their more 'finished' and formal counterparts. If we adopt this perspective, then we must move away from the dominant knowledge paradigm within which bureaucratic work is understood – one that relies on the distinction between formal, legal documents and practices, on the one hand, and informal, extra-legal ones on the other. Then, we need to pay analytical attention to the ways in which the very processes that generate key documents are, at the same time, elemental to the reproduction of bureaucratic authority.

On a methodological level, we have learnt that a fuller understanding of policy making requires tracing genealogies that not only take into account the context of a given document's production but its relation to other documents in circulation. These documents may have been issued before, at the same time as, or after the production and circulation of the document being studied. For example, without the history of the documents and resulting experiments that preceded the *Guião sobre a organização e o funcionamento dos Conselhos Locais*, one can hardly understand how local state bureaucrats were able to make sense of such a provisional and ambiguous document, let alone effectively implement it in accordance with the constitution of District Local Councils.

With the analytical and methodological insights outlined above, we begin to understand the impact on African governance of rule through ambiguous bureaucratic documents. The very fact of their provisionality and ambiguity often generates a feedback loop through which the focus of bureaucratic work is shifted from the substance of policy to the process of policy making.⁶⁸ While these documents may signal the direction of policies, they ultimately allow party and state officials to determine the timing of policy implementation. In the process, governance is centred on a form of bureaucratic authority that is more deeply invested in controlling the timing of policy implementation than in the effective implementation of policies themselves.

68. For a similar account in colonial Zanzibar, see William Bissell, *Urban Design, Chaos, and Colonial Power in Zanzibar* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2011), p. 275.